No 3 (2022)

In modern philosophy, the topic of “ontological turn” and “impossible reality” is relevant. The author considers this situation in a semiotic way. The object of the research is the search for a symbolic environment representing the “Impossible”. The author analyzes the specifics of the presentative language (non-discursive sign systems) and specifically digital imagery. The assumption is substantiated that the desired symbolic mediation with the “Impossible” can be found in this area. The author makes an assumption about the pragmatic effect of this communicative situation. This effect is associated with the possibility of an ontological “update”: the formation of new conditions for the intelligibility of experience. Further, the author discusses the heuristic potential of computer games as a model situation of contact with the “Impossible”. Based on the analysis of 4D Toys and Miegakure, the author proposes a sketch of the ontology of 4D-spatiality. She discusses the possibility of an “open ontology" and the heuristic potential of "building up" transcendental possibilities. At the same time, the author questions the previous understanding of “peculiarity” and “selectivity” in the knowledge of the “beyond”: the experience of a virtuoso gamer allows us to update the idea of our abilities to overcome the boundaries of reality (for a gamer, the physics of a particular game world). This refutes the myth of the “perfect game”, just as glitch art refutes the myth of the “perfect signal”. It is no longer possible to contrast “signal” and “noise”, “game” and “glitches”. Thus, the article draws attention to an important pragmatic aspect of digital images and, as a result, substantiates the possibility of convergence of theoretical philosophical positions and the practice of game design as projects implementing an “open ontology”.

This article discusses a special way of the bodily presence of the viewer in various works designed for virtual reality. In some of them, the viewer is not able to interact with the world of a virtual installation and influence the events taking place in it (although they can, for example, move through the digital space); in others, there is a limited quality of presence at the perception (but not action) level leading to a meaningful result: when the viewer is compelled to observe events as the director/artist intended – their gaze is built into the point of view of the director or camera. Finally, there is a third type of VR projects where we find an enhancing user interaction with the digital environment. Viewer’s capacities – including the ability to move in the space of the installation and interact with it – depend on the “genealogy” of a particular VR piece. There are basically two types of VR pieces that have the same image and sound output devices, but differ significantly from each other in the way moving image is produced and in the kind of effect produced on a recipient. The first type involves the creation of real-life decoration with actors in it filmed on a panoramic camera (a device with a 360-degree view). This kind of the piece is similar to panoramic cinema: it is basically a film that provides a high-quality image and a bright immersive effect, but does not provide the viewer (just like classical cinema) with the opportunity to interact with screen reality. In these cases interactivity goes down to choosing the point of observation and following the camera. Examples reviewed in the current article include such pieces as “Caves”, “Container”, “Montegelato” (demonstrated at the Venice VR Expanded, 2021 program), etc. The second type of VR is based on creation of virtual space and 3D models of characters and objects inside it (“Goliath”, “Anandala”, “Last Worker”, “Samsara”, “Lavrinthos”, also viewed in Venice). These pieces are technically part of a game-design framework since they are constructed on game “engines” and imply a high degree of interactivity. Here the emphasis is on the interaction with an artificially created world, even though authors may limit the viewer’s ability to act within the VR space and make only limited number of choices. Observing various strategies of interaction in VR, I outline three kinds of them: (1) lack of interaction; (2) limited interaction (participation at the level of perception, but not action); (3) full-fledged interaction. Artists put the very phenomenon of interactivity into question each time eliminating certain aspects of this experience. For example, a user can be deprived of an ability to move (as in the Tree VR project offering one to “be” a tree that cannot “respond” to the violence committed against it) or, conversely, granting one such “rights” and “powers” in the virtual world that are hardly imaginable in everyday practices (flight, telekinesis, etc.). The element of interactivity may either structure the project or, on the contrary, be “bracketed”, users’ actions (participation or the lack of it) turn into means of artistic expression. What kind of expression? How can we describe the experience that a viewer gets interacting with VR pieces? The current article provides an answer to these questions in a broad sociocultural context, including issues of bio- and digital ethics. I examine the VR pieces of the first and second type (where a viewer is limited in actions and cannot influence the events taking place in the installation) and explore the difference between them, conceptualize the compelled inaction of the viewer. In this regard, based on the concept of event introduced by French philosopher A. Badiou (meaning something that changes the frame of our perception of reality), I agrue that VR technologies can be considered as a machine for producing events – an apparatus for actualizing potentialities that are converted into events for the viewer and in the future may or may not become a reality. It depends on whether the viewer decides to “embed” the opportunity offered by the virtual event into their Weltbild. For example, one could take off VR-glasses and transfer the aesthetic affect into some kind of action in reality beginning to show greater social responsibility, taking part in social assistance programs, becoming more tolerant, etc. The effectiveness of this approach is demonstrated by experiments conducted in the Virtual Human Interaction Lab at Stanford University (USA). Furthermore, I focus on projects that create the possibility of communicating and interacting with nonhuman agents that populate the space of VR installations. And the emphasis is shifted from the “anthrope”, who is used to seeing oneself in the center of the world (a subjective position that has been constructed in Western culture since the Renaissance) to the play of nonhuman entities. This pulls up the paradigm of anthropocentrism, basic to European culture, and provides one with an ability to think and act on a completely different level — on extra-egocentric one. In case when the viewer has freedom of movement and interaction within the VR world, the rules and restrictions that the artist/director imposes on this interaction are important, since the quality of viewer’s experience will be shaped by it. It is the need to perform motoric actions aimed at achieving a specific goal (or the impossibility of doing so, as in case of projects of the first and second types) that shapes viewer’s identity in the field. In a VR installation of the third type (“full-fledged presence”), the viewer can, like an actor in the Stanislavsky Theater, become an actor “in the proposed circumstances”. The elements of such installation and models of user’s interaction scenarios with its interface (including motoric actions) are aimed at helping the viewer get immersed into their “role”. However, if in theatrical plays and films actors were supposed to perform for a spectator to follow the plot and transfer their emotional and cognitive projections onto it, in VR these projections are turned onto the viewer. Thus, in the field of virtual reality, languages of various arts intersect: theater, cinema, game design, etc. are giving rise to multiple hybrid formats of experience. Projects of the third type can also be seen as shattering the viewer’s habitual egocentric position. Such projects, which problematize our experience as a contingent construct, make it possible to design an experience of alternative subjectivity. I argue that the development of virtual reality makes it possible to build the experience of a new sensual plane: a re-subjectivised and superhuman vision of multidimensional relationships between phenomena and events in the world. Thereby our way of thinking is being brought to a completely different level: an extra-egocentric state that forms a new optics of “planetary vision”. ”Planetary optics” does not imply a view from afar. The precise (not abstract) way of thinking is a challenging thing; it is hard to get away from reducing reality to familiar schemes, binary oppositions and common hierarchies. That is why, while analyzing the strategies of artists working with the medium of VR throughout this article, I focus on pieces where these familiar schemes get overturned. A hunter becomes a prey, an actor becomes a non-participant, and so on. The binaries of male and female, Eurocentrism and Orientalism, nature and culture, animal and machine get blurred not to erase the boundaries between them but with the aim of offering the spectator-actor a new perspective or even a set of perspectives, points of view, positions of various stakeholders, polarities and experience of a multipolar world. “Planetary optics” does assume a multipolar world (after all, we cannot block some part of it and separate ourselves from other beings, we are too intertwined with other techno- and biological actors) — and one of the ways to achieve this multipolar way of thinking can be through the experience offered by the VR medium, an artistic image that becomes personal experience. And, in turn, existing experience will allow the viewer to attain a more flexible and tuned perception, correlating it with the Weltbild, perhaps, of social groups far from it with their own interests, which however must be taken into account. Therefore, VR as a medium has not only artistic, but also social meaning, since it may concretize and focus human thinking, prone to abstraction, it may synthesize the sensual and the rational. The further development of virtual reality will perhaps make it possible to build a visual experience of a new kind: one associated with a different scale of view, different assemblage points, the experience of a hybrid space that combines the virtual and the real (what might be called a “meta screen”), so that the user will be able to look at the world with a different vision (for example, to see multidimensional connections and networks of actors in different approximations).

Semantic theories by Kaplan and Katz represent a view on ordinary language opposed to the view of the late Wittgenstein, Strawson, and others. Both Kaplan’s and Katz’s theories accommodate phenomena of contextuality, whereas Wittgenstein and Strawson held that contextuality makes a semantic theory for ordinary language impossible. I compare the two theories and show that both are based on analogous fourfold distinctions. In Kaplan, it is the distinction of expression, character, content, and reference. The analogous distinction in Katz is the distinction of expression, the sense of expression-type, the sense of expression-token, and reference. The analogy between Kaplan’s character and Katz’s sense of expression-type is established by the fact that both are, formally speaking, functions from contexts. Content (Kaplan) and the sense of expression-token (Katz) are similar in that both determine reference (extension) with respect to a possible world. So we can conclude that both theories represent the same approach to contextuality.

This short remark, which is a minor objection to Vsevolod A. Ladov’s panel article “Gottlob Frege’s Semantics in Modern Analytic Philosophy”, examines one of the critical arguments put forward by Jerrold Katz against Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “meaning as use”. I am talking about the argument that fixing deeper meanings of grammatical forms that are not relativized in language games allows us to show that the meanings of grammatical forms are not caused in a specific language game. I show that, if only a certain action can be treated as a criterion for understanding meaning in the framework of communication, then the crucial importance is not so much the propositional content of this action as its illocutionary force. Without the illocutionary force, the meaning of linguistic form is quite difficult to understand, if at all possible. The reference to normative sentences expressed by special prescriptive speech acts made it possible to show that the differences between orders, requests, predictions manifest themselves only at the pragmatic level of language use, there is no such difference at the semantic level. Beyond the context of a particular language game, such a distinction cannot be made.

This article is the final remark in the discussion on issues related to the construction of a semantic theory of ordinary language. Is a semantic theory of ordinary language possible? What form should this theory take? Is it possible to revive Gottlob Frege’s semantics in modern analytic philosophy? Can Jerrold Katz’s linguistic Platonism claim the status of a semantic theory of ordinary language? Is the concept “meaning as use” of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein a semantic theory? The participants of the discussion tried to answer these questions. The author of this article gives a brief summary of the positions presented in the discussion and draws general conclusions.