Email this article ON A SEMANTIC THEORY OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE (RESPONSE TO OPPONENTS)
- Authors: Ladov V.A1,2
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Affiliations:
- Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- Tomsk State University
- Issue: No 3 (2022)
- Pages: 145-152
- Section: ARTICLES
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/2312-7899/article/view/269543
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.23951/2312-7899-2022-3-145-152
- ID: 269543
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Abstract
This article is the final remark in the discussion on issues related to the construction of a semantic theory of ordinary language. Is a semantic theory of ordinary language possible? What form should this theory take? Is it possible to revive Gottlob Frege’s semantics in modern analytic philosophy? Can Jerrold Katz’s linguistic Platonism claim the status of a semantic theory of ordinary language? Is the concept “meaning as use” of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein a semantic theory? The participants of the discussion tried to answer these questions. The author of this article gives a brief summary of the positions presented in the discussion and draws general conclusions.
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About the authors
Vsevolod A Ladov
Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Tomsk State University
Email: ladov@yandex.ru
10/4 av. Akademichesky, Tomsk, Russia 634055; 36 Lenin Ave., Tomsk, Russia 634050
References
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- Ladov 2019 – Ladov V. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and a Hierarchical Approach to Solving Logical Paradoxes // Filosofija. Sociologija. 2019. T. 30 (1). P. 36–43.
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