A Game-Theoretic Model of Agreement on Limitation of Transboundary Air Pollution
- Autores: Vasin A.A.1, Divtsova A.G.1
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Afiliações:
- Moscow State University
- Edição: Volume 80, Nº 6 (2019)
- Páginas: 1164-1176
- Seção: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/0005-1179/article/view/151424
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919060134
- ID: 151424
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Resumo
This paper considers a model of agreements for the problem of transboundary air pollution by industrial emissions. The interaction of countries is described by a repeated game with side payments. The aim is to find the existence conditions of a subgame perfect equilibrium that implements a Pareto-optimal strategy profile in each period of the game.
Sobre autores
A. Vasin
Moscow State University
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: vasin@cs.msu.su
Rússia, Moscow
A. Divtsova
Moscow State University
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: nastyakislaeva@gmail.com
Rússia, Moscow
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