Email this article Atomic Routing Game with Capacity Constraints
- Authors: Pal’tseva D.A.1,2, Parfenov A.P.1,2
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Affiliations:
- Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes
- Institute for Problems of Regional Economics
- Issue: Vol 80, No 10 (2019)
- Pages: 1901-1911
- Section: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/0005-1179/article/view/151201
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919100102
- ID: 151201
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Abstract
A model of an atomic routing game is considered. A network in this model has capacity constraints. Players in this game choose routes from some sources to one sink. The cost of passing each arc is determined by an increasing and convex function that depends on the number of players. Algorithms for finding the Nash equilibrium and social optimum are developed. These algorithms have a polynomial time complexity. The model can be used for transport networks with limited traffic flows.
About the authors
D. A. Pal’tseva
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes; Institute for Problems of Regional Economics
Author for correspondence.
Email: adandreevna@mail.ru
Russian Federation, St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg
A. P. Parfenov
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes; Institute for Problems of Regional Economics
Email: adandreevna@mail.ru
Russian Federation, St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg
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