Email this article Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions
- Authors: Geras’kin M.I.1, Chkhartishvili A.G.2
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Affiliations:
- Korolev Samara National Research University
- Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences
- Issue: Vol 78, No 9 (2017)
- Pages: 1631-1650
- Section: Control in Social Economic Systems
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/0005-1179/article/view/150683
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917090089
- ID: 150683
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Abstract
We construct oligopoly models for nonlinear cost functions of agents under reflexive information. We obtain conditions for Nash equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric agent information in Cournot and Stackelberg reaction models (in case of one or several leaders).
About the authors
M. I. Geras’kin
Korolev Samara National Research University
Author for correspondence.
Email: innovation@ssau.ru
Russian Federation, Samara
A. G. Chkhartishvili
Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences
Email: innovation@ssau.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow
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