Enviar artigo por via de e-mail Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions
- Autores: Geras’kin M.I.1, Chkhartishvili A.G.2
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Afiliações:
- Korolev Samara National Research University
- Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences
- Edição: Volume 78, Nº 9 (2017)
- Páginas: 1631-1650
- Seção: Control in Social Economic Systems
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/0005-1179/article/view/150683
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917090089
- ID: 150683
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Resumo
We construct oligopoly models for nonlinear cost functions of agents under reflexive information. We obtain conditions for Nash equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric agent information in Cournot and Stackelberg reaction models (in case of one or several leaders).
Sobre autores
M. Geras’kin
Korolev Samara National Research University
Autor responsável pela correspondência
Email: innovation@ssau.ru
Rússia, Samara
A. Chkhartishvili
Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences
Email: innovation@ssau.ru
Rússia, Moscow
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