General inspectors of infantry, cavalry, and engineering units in the Russian army and the issue of the boundaries of their powers in the system of high military administration of Russia in the early 20th century

The article examines one aspect of military policy between 1905 and 1914 – the introduction of the institution of general inspectors of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering corps into the overall structure of the highest military administration of the Russian Empire at that time. The subject of the research is the scope of the powers of general inspectors from 1905 to 1909, i.e., during the period of decentralized military administration when the military minister’s authority in the army was significantly reduced through the separation of the General Staff and the establishment of the Council of State Defense – a collegial, advisory body composed equally of the military and naval ministers, the head of the General Staff, general inspectors, and other figures from the highest military circles. The aim of the study is to analyze the process of preparing and adopting the "Regulations on General Inspectors" within the higher military administration – an important document intended to define the clear status of general inspectors within the military management hierarchy and delineate their areas of responsibility and powers. The methodology of the research involves working with archival, unpublished materials from the RGAVMF (Fund 830, Council of State Defense of Russia) and is based on a comparative approach to the sources. An additional source consists of published memoirs of the military minister of Russia from 1905 to 1909, A.F. Rediger. The analysis of official documentation and personal sources indicates that the creation of roles for general inspectors at the top of military administration, as autonomous from the military minister, was an attempt by an influential group from the August House of Romanov, traditionally closely connected with the Russian army, to control the process of military reforms following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The author suggests that this group (including the emperor himself) either did not fully trust the traditional bureaucracy to carry out the reforms during such a crisis or sought to pursue their personal interests in the army (the grand dukes) through the institutions of general inspectors. In any case, this administrative reorganization ultimately complicated the already intricate higher administration of the Russian army, while the integration of autonomous general inspectors into the army demonstrates the complexity and inertia of the military-bureaucratic machine of that time.

Inspector General, National Defense Council, War Ministry, infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering troops, military administration, military department, military policy