Static Models of Coordination of Social and Private Interests in Resource Allocation


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Abstract

This paper analyzes conditions of system compatibility in the game-theoretic models of resource allocation between social and private activities. We describe economic and administrative control mechanisms for system compatibility.

About the authors

O. I. Gorbaneva

Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences

Author for correspondence.
Email: gorbaneva@mail.ru
Russian Federation, Rostov-on-Don

G. A. Ougolnitsky

Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences

Email: gorbaneva@mail.ru
Russian Federation, Rostov-on-Don

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