Two-node market under imperfect competition


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Abstract

In this paper, we consider a Cournot auction with uniform nodal prices for a two-node market. The structure of each local market is an oligopoly. We demonstrate how the type of Nash equilibrium depends on the throughput. Finally, we investigate the optimum throughput problem under an imperfect competition in the market.

About the authors

A. A. Vasin

Moscow State University

Author for correspondence.
Email: vasin@cs.msu.su
Russian Federation, Moscow

E. A. Daylova

Moscow State University

Email: vasin@cs.msu.su
Russian Federation, Moscow

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