Defense of Integrative Pluralism in the Cognitive Sciences

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This article considers the opposition between the pluralist and unificationist stances in the philosophy of cognitive sciences. The choice between pluralism and unificationism is important both in terms of discussing the current methodological practices and with respect to the debates about the future of the cognitive studies. As a starting point, the author takes his own idea of theoretical complexes. One of its most significant normative consequences is theoretical pluralism. There have been a number of skeptical arguments against pluralism, including the fear of generating many useless theories and dissipating of efforts, as well as the doubts about the differences between pluralism and relativism. One of the most recent objections states that integrative pluralism implies a tension, an instability, if one prioritizes the epistemic quality of explanatory depth. The author addresses each of these objections in turn. The constructive variety of pluralism is distinguished from unbridled pluralism and relativism by its commitment to the idea of improving explanatory, predictive, and other characteristics of a theory through the presence of alternatives and their collisions, mutual criticisms. Integrative pluralism does not entail instability, since the values of unification and explanatory depth cannot be prescribed to the cognitive sciences ex cathedra, without taking into account the character of the cognitive process revealed in empirical studies. The pluralist stance appears to be incompatible with radical projects of unification of the cognitive studies, though there are many opportunities for more moderate integrative initiatives. One such initiative is the recent idea of integrative experiment design, which involves constructing a space of experiments for a particular problem. Testing theories by selectively sampling points in this space and then updating them accordingly may be a key to the integration of experimental observations.

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