Beyond Algorithms: The Philosophical Critique of Hubert Dreyfus
- Authors: Moskvitin V.A.1
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Affiliations:
- Issue: No 11 (2025)
- Pages: 161-178
- Section: Articles
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/2409-8728/article/view/365450
- EDN: https://elibrary.ru/KOLIJB
- ID: 365450
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Abstract
The present article is dedicated to a philosophical analysis of the criticism put forward by Hubert Dreyfus against traditional concepts of artificial intelligence (AI). It focuses on a detailed exposition of Dreyfus's arguments regarding the fundamental limitations of the symbolic approach in AI, which reduces human thinking to formalized algorithmic structures. The study examines key works by Dreyfus, such as "Alchemy and AI" and "What Computers Can't Do," as well as his reference to the phenomenological tradition represented by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Special attention is given to the critique of the rationalist assumptions underlying contemporary AI. The study emphasizes Dreyfus's assertion that human intelligence cannot be reduced to computational systems, as it is conditioned by the importance of unconscious mechanisms, bodily experience, and sociocultural context in the process of cognition. The methodology includes a philosophical analysis of Dreyfus's key works, a deconstruction of rationalist and functionalist concepts of AI, and a comparison of the symbolic approach with alternative paradigms (neural networks, embodied cognition theory). Hermeneutic and phenomenological methods are used to reveal the ontological and epistemological foundations of the critique. The scientific novelty of this research manifests in the deep systematization and theoretical understanding of Dreyfus's critical positions against traditional paradigms of classical artificial intelligence. At the center of the analysis is his five-stage model of skill acquisition—the journey from novice to expert—which reveals the transformation of cognitive processes from formalized algorithmic thinking to intuitively-based understanding. The inherent non-formalizability of common sense and professional expertise is justified, as they have their roots in bodily-oriented experience and the historical-social acculturation of the subject. The conclusion emphasizes the need to shift research priorities in the field of AI from purely symbolic methods to hybrid cognitive systems capable of integrating existential, cultural, and empirical dimensions of human existence. Dreyfus's critical discourse urges a rethinking of technocratic practices in the creation of intelligent systems and stimulates the introduction of philosophical categories and methodologies into the core development of future intelligent technologies.
About the authors
Valerii Aleksandrovich Moskvitin
Email: moskvitin_va@voenmeh.ru
ORCID iD: 0009-0003-7642-6198
References
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