«Revolutionary warfare» theory and the legacy of D. Galula’ and R. Trinquer’ ideas

In the presented article, the «revolutionary warfare» theory and its impact on the armed forces of France in the era of decolonization after World War II are viewed through the prism of the ideological and theoretical legacies of the two most famous representatives of the «French school» of colonial counterinsurgency of the second half of the XXth century – David Galula and Roger Trinquer. The discrepancies and similarities of the «revolutionary warfare» theory and the main provisions of the military-theoretical works of D. Galula and R. Trinquer are sorted out in the context of the formation and the subsequent abandonment of it among the French military class in the 1950s and 60s. In this regard, the work touches upon not only the specifics of the perception by officers of the colonial service in this historical period of events in the dependent territories and in the metropolis, but also their correlation with the ideas of D. Galula and R. Trinquer in the framework of the counterinsurgency. Particular attention is paid to the characteristic features of the research optics of their consideration of the actions of the French army in Indochina (1946–1954) and Algeria (1954–1962), including ideas about the permissible limits of the use of force and the role of the army and civil services in ensuring the colonial order, in the context of the «revolutionary warfare» theory.