A Securities Selling Game
- 作者: Morozov V.V.1
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隶属关系:
- Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Lomonosov Moscow State University
- 期: 卷 30, 编号 3 (2019)
- 页面: 295-301
- 栏目: Article
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/1046-283X/article/view/247901
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10598-019-09455-w
- ID: 247901
如何引用文章
详细
We consider the sale of k securities in n trades, with not more than one security per trade. The sale results are assessed using the competitive ratio of the sum of k highest security prices to the total sale revenue. Lorenz constructed the solution of the game for 2k ≤ n. In this article, the solution is obtained in the general case both for the competitive ratio and for the Savage regret criterion.
作者简介
V. Morozov
Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Lomonosov Moscow State University
编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: vmorosov@mail.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow
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