An Environment-Protection Hierarchical Differential Game Between Enterprise and State


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Abstract

We consider an environment-protection hierarchical differential game between enterprise and state with the state acting as the leader. An algorithm for approximate solution of the game is proposed.

About the authors

E. V. Grigor’eva

Department of Mathematics and Computer Sciences, Texas Women’s University

Email: cmm@cs.msu.ru
United States, Denton, TX

E. N. Khailov

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Computation Mathematics and Cybernetics

Email: cmm@cs.msu.ru
Russian Federation, Moscow

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