The modern doctrine of the sources of law in Anglo-American jurisprudence

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Abstract

The article examines the problems of determining the content and nature of the modern doctrine of sources of law in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Traditional approaches to judicial practice as the main characteristic of the forms and ways of expressing law in the Anglo-American legal tradition are currently being significantly supplemented in line with various theories of legal understanding, focusing primarily on procedural models for developing legally significant decisions. The study points to the dynamics of ideas about the sources of law in general and the Anglo-American legal tradition in particular. The causes and features of the changes are determined. It is emphasized that in line with Anglo-American jurisprudence, many traditional problems of legal understanding, including the question of the sources of law, are understood in the plane of logical and cognitive interpretations. The article examines the attempts of a number of well-known English and American jurists, as well as their European colleagues, to relate the problem of understanding the sources of law to the sphere of logic of legal argumentation and the corresponding semantic analysis. Suggestions are made about the possibility of a more detailed study of the construction of legal formants and their characteristics both within the framework of the proposed approaches (argumentation theory, legal hermeneutics) and in general.

About the authors

V. S. Gorban

Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Author for correspondence.
Email: gorbanv@gmail.com
10 Znamenka str., 119019 Moscow, Russia

N. V. Krotkova

Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Email: krotkova2012@yandex.ru
10 Znamenka str., 119019 Moscow, Russia

G. V. Gruzdev

Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Email: philosophyoflaw@igpran.ru
10 Znamenka str., 119019 Moscow, Russia

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