Models of informational confrontation in mob control


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Within the stochastic models of mob control, this paper explores the game-theoretic models of informational confrontation when agents are simultaneously controlled by two subjects with noncoinciding interests regarding the number of active agents in an equilibrium state.

作者简介

D. Novikov

Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences

编辑信件的主要联系方式.
Email: novikov@ipu.ru
俄罗斯联邦, Moscow

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