On the k-accessibility of cores of TU-cooperative games

Resumo

This paper proposes a strengthening of the author’s core-accessibility theorem for balanced TU-cooperative games. The obtained strengthening relaxes the influence of the nontransitivity of classical domination αv on the quality of the sequential improvement of dominated imputations in a game v. More specifically, we establish the k-accessibility of the core C(α_v) of any balanced TU-cooperative game v for all natural numbers k: for each dominated imputation x, there exists a converging sequence of imputations x₀, x₁,..., such that x₀ = x, lim x_r ∈ C(α_v) and x_r−m is dominated by any successive imputation x_r with m ∈ [1, k] and r ≥ m. For showing that the TU-property is essential to provide the k-accessibility of the core, we give an example of an NTU-cooperative game G with a ”black hole” representing a nonempty closed subset B ⊆ G(N) of dominated imputations that contains all the α_G-monotonic sequential improvement trajectories originating at any point x ∈ B.