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Comparison of Methods of Organization and Management Efficiency in Dynamic Models of Cournot Oligopoly
- Authors: Korolev A.V.1, Kotova M.A.1, Ugolnitsky G.A.2
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Affiliations:
- Branch of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, 190068, St. Petersburg, Russia
- Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia
- Issue: No 1 (2023)
- Pages: 82-105
- Section: SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH
- URL: https://ogarev-online.ru/0002-3388/article/view/136854
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.31857/S0002338823010043
- EDN: https://elibrary.ru/HENZDJ
- ID: 136854
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Abstract
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for dynamic game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models in normal form with inhomogeneous agents are found analytically. Cooperative game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models of three persons in the form of the von Neumann–Morgenstern and Gromova–Petrosyan characteristic functions are studied, including the calculation of the Shapley vector. A comparative analysis of the payoffs of agents, according to the solutions obtained, is carried out for games in normal form and in the form of a characteristic function.
About the authors
A. V. Korolev
Branch of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, 190068, St. Petersburg, Russia
Email: danitschi@gmail.com
Россия, Санкт-Петербург
M. A. Kotova
Branch of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, 190068, St. Petersburg, Russia
Email: makotova_2@edu.hse.ru
Россия, Санкт-Петербург
G. A. Ugolnitsky
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia
Author for correspondence.
Email: ougoln@mail.ru
Россия, Ростов-на-Дону
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