

УДК 327 (510:73)

DOI: 10.31857/S2686673024120029

EDN: WPAPCW

Transregional Security Impacts of the Special Military Operation and Strategic Interests of the United States and China (Part 2)*

Sun Yixiang

*School of Governance and Politics of MGIMO,
76 Prospekt Vernadskogo, 119454 Moscow, Russian Federation.
Faculty of Political Sciences of the Lomonosov Moscow State University.
1 Leninskie Gory, 119991 Moscow, Russian Federation.
Institute of Chinese and Contemporary Asian Studies
of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
32 Nakhimovsky prospect, 117997 Moscow, Russian Federation.
E-mail: sunyixiang123@mail.ru*

Abstract: The article analyzes the evolving dynamics of global strategic interests amid major international conflicts, focusing on the geopolitical consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the strategic maneuvers of key powers like the United States, NATO, China, and Russia. It explores how the U.S. has utilized the conflict to realign its global influence, strengthen NATO, and project power in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing its intention to counter both Russian and Chinese influence. The U.S. benefits economically from Europe's growing dependency, while using the conflict to enhance military-industrial partnerships and sanctioning regimes targeting Russia and China. China's strategic realignment, in response, seeks to bolster Sino-Russian cooperation and expand influence in the Asia-Pacific through initiatives like the "Asian Mediterranean" concept, which envisions deeper Eurasian integration. The author outlines China's attempts to balance its maritime and land power dynamics while navigating heightened U.S. efforts to isolate it diplomatically and militarily. It also highlights the potential for high-tech cooperation between China and Russia as a countermeasure to Western sanctions and technological blockades.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine conflict, U.S. strategic interests, NATO expansion, China-Russia cooperation, U.S.-China relations, Indo-Pacific strategy, geopolitical realignment, economic sanctions, Eurasian integration, Asian Mediterranean, strategic competition, multilateral security, diplomatic communication.

For citation: Sun Yixiang. Transregional Security Impacts of the Special Military Operation and Strategic Interests of the United States and China. *USA & Canada: Economics, Politics, Culture*. 2024;54(12):20–33. DOI:10.31857/S2686673024120029 EDN: WPAPCW

* Данная статья является второй частью исследования автора. Первая часть статьи опубликована в №7 журнала за 2024 год.

Последствия специальной военной операции для трансрегиональной безопасности и стратегические интересы США и Китая (часть 2)

Сунь Исян

*Факультет управления и политики МГИМО,
Российская Федерация, 119454 Москва, Проспект Вернадского, 76.
Факультет политологии Московского государственного университета
им. М.В. Ломоносова.*

Российская Федерация, 119991 Москва, Ленинские горы, 1.

Институт Китая и современной Азии

Российской академии наук.

Российская Федерация, 117997 Москва, Нахимовский проспект, 32.

E-mail: sunyixiang123@mail.ru

Резюме: В статье анализируется динамика изменения глобальных стратегических интересов в условиях крупных международных конфликтов, особое внимание уделяется геополитическим последствиям российско-украинского конфликта и стратегическим ходам ключевых держав, таких как США, НАТО, Китай и Россия. Рассматривается, как США использовали конфликт для перестройки своего глобального влияния, укрепления НАТО и распространения своих возможностей в Индо-Тихоокеанском регионе, подчёркивая своё намерение противостоять как российскому, так и китайскому влиянию. США извлекают экономическую выгоду из растущей зависимости Европы, одновременно используя конфликт для укрепления военно-промышленного партнёрства и санкционных режимов, направленных против России и Китая.

Стратегическое переориентирование Китая, в свою очередь, направлено на укрепление китайско-российского сотрудничества и расширение влияния в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе с помощью таких инициатив, как концепция «Азиатского Средиземноморья», предусматривающая углубление евразийской интеграции. В статье описываются попытки Китая сбалансировать тенденции развития своей морской и сухопутной мощи, ориентируясь при этом на активизацию усилий США по его дипломатической и военной изоляции. Автор также подчёркивает наличие потенциала сотрудничества в области высоких технологий между Китаем и Россией в качестве ответной меры на западные санкции и меры технологического давления.

Ключевые слова: Российско-украинский конфликт, стратегические интересы США, расширение НАТО, российско-китайское сотрудничество, американо-китайские отношения, индо-тихоокеанская стратегия, геополитическое переустройство, экономические санкции, евразийская интеграция, азиатское Средиземноморье, стратегическая конкуренция, многосторонняя безопасность, дипломатическое взаимодействие.

Для цитирования: Сунь Исян. Трансрегиональные последствия специальной военной операции для безопасности и стратегические интересы США и Китая. США & Канада: экономика, политика, культура. 2024; 54(12): 20–33. DOI: 10.31857/S2686673024120029 EDN: WPAPCW

INTRODUCTION

Faced with the enormous challenges of frequent international political conflicts and increasing social risks in conflict zones, major powers, especially superpowers with global power projection capabilities and hegemonic status challengers, dominate the movement of the international order strategic balance in chaos through their actions and decisions, and are key forces in shaping the changes and development of the balance of power. How can the United States (and NATO) use the Russia-Ukraine conflict to adjust and strengthen its global strategic layout? How can China reposition its strategic interests in the Asia Pacific region and globally? How does China Russia cooperation affect the geopolitical and economic landscape of the Asia Pacific region? How to prevent the deterioration of *Sino-US* relations and rebalance the triangular relationship between China, U.S. and Russia through diplomacy and strategic communication? In this article, the author will attempt to provide a specific analysis of the aforementioned issues.

THE UNITED STATES' DIPLOMATIC PATH DEPENDENCE AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS

The U.S. has achieved or is in the process of achieving **six major strategic goals** through this round of Russia-Ukraine conflict. **First**, the SMO seriously imbalanced the security situation in Europe. The U.S. successfully used this to provoke conflicts between Russia and Europe, increased NATO countries' fear of Russia, and strengthened the U.S.' control over its European allies. After the special military operation began, the prospects for the European security pattern that the EU originally wanted to establish became increasingly bleak. The pan-European OSCE began to turn toward the U.S., and the EU's ability to lead European security affairs was further weakened.

In the foreseeable future, the EU still faces a fundamental dilemma that can only be mitigated but not fully resolved: in its new confrontational security order, the EU's strategic dependence on the U.S. has increased, while the United States' long-term alliance commitment to the EU is full of uncertainty. At the same time, this has also seriously hindered China's "One Belt One Road" European trade channel.

Second, the outbreak of the conflict caused European funds to flow to the U.S., which was conducive to the recovery of the U.S. economy and the revitalization of the manufacturing industry. Since 2022, the euro's exchange rate against the U.S. dollar has continued to decline, falling below parity for the first time in 20 years, exacerbating inflation risks in the euro area. Eurozone core inflation rose to 5.6% in February from 5.3% in January [1]. After Germany announced it would stop certification of "Nord Stream-2" and European countries reduced imports of oil and natural gas from Russia, in March 2022, Europe and the U.S. signed a natural gas export agreement to significantly increase U.S. natural gas exports to Europe. In addition, the tight energy supply caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict has increased corporate production costs, resulting in the loss of manufacturing jobs, further exacerbating Europe's "deindustrializa-

tion" trend. In the long term, the decline in manufacturing competitiveness will endanger Europe's social stability and economic development momentum.

The energy crisis, inflation and manufacturing crisis have put the EU under multiple pressures. While the EU is assisting Ukraine, it also has to deal with internal economic problems, which makes it overwhelmed and exhausted, which greatly affects the subsequent development of its strategic independence.

Third, the conflict provided an excuse for the U.S. to provide military assistance to Ukraine, strengthen the deployment of troops in Europe, and require Germany to increase military spending. Germany officially decided to purchase American F-35 fighter jets, and the U.S. military-industrial complex received a large number of orders from it. Throughout 2022, the share price of Lockheed Martin, the "leader" of the US military industry, rose by 37%, the share price of Northrop Grumman rose by 40%, and the share price of Raytheon Technologies rose by nearly 17% [4].

Fourth, after the Biden administration's repeated claims that Russia was about to use military force against Ukraine were confirmed, some countries' credibility in U.S. intelligence increased. Focusing on the issue of sanctions against Russia and China, the United States has engaged in "sanctions diplomacy" around the world and put together a new sanctions system targeting "revisionist countries" such as China, Russia and Iran.

Fifth, the U.S. uses the conflict to promote "club-like globalization" and accelerate the construction of an "economic warfare" system against its strategic opponents. After taking office, the Biden administration has made greater efforts to promote the supply chain reshaping strategy, attempting to carry out "coordinated decoupling" from China with allies and partners, and build an economic system with so-called democratic countries as the main body. The conflict will further aggravate this situation. The U.S. and European countries have imposed unprecedented economic and financial sanctions on Russia and launched a comprehensive "economic war" against Russia with the intention of driving Russia out of the world economic system. Economic and financial sanctions have become a crucial "virtual front" in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The global supply chain has been artificially divided, and economic globalization and multinational companies have been "weaponized" in the process. Under the combined influence of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the continuation of the epidemic, supply chain security issues have received greater attention from all countries, and the role of value barriers in global economic relations has become more prominent.

Sixth, the conflict provides an opportunity for NATO to move towards the "Indo-Pacific". The U.S. has demonstrated its strategic determination to remain anchored in the Indo-Pacific region despite the SMO and has used the strategy of "binding China and Russia" to increase countries' awareness of the "China threat" in the Asia-Pacific region. Shortly after the conflict occurred, Biden held a Quad virtual summit with the leaders of Australia, India and Japan on March 3 to discuss the conflict and its impact on this region. The joint statement issued by the leaders of the four countries stated that the incident in Ukraine must not be allowed to happen again in the Indo-Pacific region [1]. Campbell, coordinator of Indo-Pacific affairs at the White House National Security

Council, said that the United States has been deeply involved in two "theaters" at the same time in the past, including during World War II and the Cold War; under the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States will continue to focus on "determination" in the Indo-Pacific region [2].

NATO and its member states have learned from the conflict the growing geopolitical interdependence between the transatlantic region and the "Indo-Pacific" region and realized that China's strategic rise has a non-negligible impact on global military competition, technological innovation and economic growth, and has also placed itself more in the so-called "central position" in maintaining the security order in Europe and even the "Indo-Pacific" region. It not only continuously provides assistance to Ukraine to fight Russia, but also increasingly wants to intervene in Indo-Pacific affairs [Simón. 2023]. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2023, former U.S. Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodges pointed out that Russia's military actions against Ukraine were the result of a failure of deterrence. In the Indo-Pacific region, since there is no collective defense organization like NATO, the importance of NATO's cooperation with countries in the region to check and balance China has become increasingly apparent [3]. After the conflict broke out, several countries in the Indo-Pacific region that have close relations with the West, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, etc., have chosen sides to support sanctions against Russia and assistance to Ukraine. The conflict has also made these countries more wary of China [Hornung, Channer. 2022].

The SMO not only made NATO's presence widely accepted in Europe, but also attracted new member states. European countries, led by the U.S. and its leading NATO, have provided Ukraine with important military support and anti-strike capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. and other NATO countries have used the SMO to once again emphasize China's security threats in this region and are trying to take precautions and step up their deployment in the Indo-Pacific. The "Strategic Concept" [5] and joint statement [6] issued at the NATO Summit in Madrid in 2022 both proposed that China has challenged NATO's interests, security and values. The 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, once again regarded China as a challenger to NATO's interests, security and values [7].

Former NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg said in his opening remarks at the summit that "NATO is a regional alliance between Europe and North America, but the challenges we face are global and our security is interrelated. What happens in the Euro-Atlantic region matters to the Indo-Pacific region, and what happens in the Indo-Pacific region matters to the Euro-Atlantic region" [8]. His speech emphasized the interconnectedness of global security and aimed to find excuses for NATO's globalization, especially the so-called "rationality" and "necessity" for NATO to move towards the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. is the soul guide of NATO in the Indo-Pacific, and NATO follows the footsteps towards. After the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" was launched, NATO immediately responded. The "Strategic Concept" document issued in June 2022 mentioned that "the Indo-Pacific region is very important to NATO because developments in the region may directly affect the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. 'We will strengthen cooperation

with new and old partners in the Indo-Pacific Dialogue and cooperation to address trans-regional challenges and common security interests'." [5]. Of particular note is the recent trend of the U.S. in easing arms export restrictions and dispatching military advisers to Taiwan, China.

As the U.S. and other NATO countries advance toward the Indo-Pacific, an important starting point is shared values. In the process of NATO's expansion into this region, the premise for NATO to establish partnerships with countries in the region is that both parties agree on each other's common values. The reason for cooperation with regional partners is because they "share democratic values and face similar security challenges" [Regional Perspectives Report. 2023]. Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand have also emphasized common values in their respective documents. Although these countries all recognize China's important presence in the region, they are also emphasizing the importance of cooperating with the U.S. and NATO to maintain regional security. The intervention of the U.S. and its leading NATO in Asia-Pacific affairs requires active response from countries in the region. Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Singapore are also trying to realize their own interests in the region through cooperation with the United States and NATO. The demands of both sides reached a consensus after treating China as a common threat. The U.S. used this to increase its political influence in the Asia-Pacific region, project NATO's military deterrence directly to China's periphery, and form an encirclement around China, thereby restricting China's further rise and maintaining U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.

Overall, the "Indo-Pacificization" of the United States and NATO is an important chess game promoted by the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific. After the conflict broke out, the U.S. and NATO tightened their deployment in the region and are building a huge multilateral network to both restrict China's influence and maintain its "leadership" in this region. The purpose of the U.S. is to rely on multilateral connections with partners, use NATO as its security structure, and integrate the Indo-Pacific region into a complex multi-level linkage system centered on it to contain the rise of China. In the careful deployment of the U.S., China was deliberately isolated, it must rely on greater wisdom and broader cooperation to crack this chess game.

OPPORTUNITIES BROUGHT TO CHINA BY THE SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION

Background to China's Strategic Realignment

Asia during the Cold War consisted of three security complexes: South Asia, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia. These three in turn form a loosely connected Asian super-complex. Although Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have been severely penetrated by global-level security postures, they have still formed a strong local security posture. Especially due to the existence of two global-level powers in East Asia, countries in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have begun to increasingly merge into a single regional security complex. Especially with the rapid rise of China and China's expansion

of inter-regional participation, the prospects for the Asian super complex have become clearer. However, as the two crucial variables that determine the future of Asia's security, China and the United States, there are still variables in their respective development and interaction. Therefore, deepening China-Russia relations in the grand triangle relationship is a realistic requirement under the current situation.

Robert S. Ross, professor of political science at Boston University, fellow at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, and one of the most important experts on China's foreign and defense policy and US-China relations, pointed out in his article "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the 21st Century" published in the journal "International Security" in 1999 that peace in East Asia is maintained by the balance of power, China is the land power in the region, and the United States is the maritime power in the region [Ross. 1999]. Although the U.S. is separated from Asia by the vast Pacific Ocean, it has never stopped interfering in Asian affairs. Not only that, the U.S. also regards itself as an important presence in this region. After entering the 21st century, with the rise of China, the balance of power between China and the U.S. has undergone dramatic changes. China is building offensive capabilities at sea and gradually moving from a land power to a maritime power. China's core strategic interests in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are to ensure the area denial capability against the U.S.' sea power in the Pacific, including three key parts: South China Sea security, Taiwan security issues, and Indo-Pacific security. It can be said that the strategic interests of the U.S. in the Asian super complex are also China's strategic concerns.

China's strategic interests are more material and realistic, while the strategic interests pursued by the U.S. in this historical process are more based on conceptual and conceptual goals. Politically, China and Russia jointly oppose the global hegemony of the U.S., and their positions are close to each other. Due to the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and Western countries, Russia's strength has been weakened and it relies more on China. While economic cooperation between China and Russia has been strengthened, China has actually helped Russia relieve the economic and political pressure from the West [Wishnick. 2023]. The U.S. and some Western countries are very dissatisfied with the cooperation between China and Russia, and the strengthened cooperation between China and Russia has made them even more worried. China's position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict is inconsistent with that of the U.S. and Europe. As a result, the U.S. has become more wary of China and even believes that future confrontation between the U.S. and China is more possible [de Lisle, Cozen. 2022]. In this context, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to the U.S.' reassessment of the security situation in the Indo-Pacific region, and the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific region is changing significantly [Galic et al. 2022].

"The Asian Mediterranean" – A New Future for Eurasia

Sino-Russian cooperation will demonstrate its strong and profound penetration in key areas and core areas of global transformation. "Asian Mediterranean" is such an

important concept that can reflect the current height and forward-looking nature of China-Russia cooperation. At the end of the 20th century, French economist Francois Gipouloux once proposed the concept of "Asia's Mediterranean". He believes that the developing Western Pacific region, specifically the vast coastal countries and regions of the Western Pacific, from the Sea of Japan to Malacca, can not only promote cooperation among countries through long-term economic prosperity and development, but also contribute to humanity in various fields such as politics, society, and civilization-building, just like the European Mediterranean [Gipouloux. 2009].

The objective basis for promoting the concept of "Asian Mediterranean" is: **first**, after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's strategic arrangement of shifting its economic center of gravity eastwards has provided new factors and very important opportunities for the regionalization of the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the long-term growth trend of Asia is favored by the whole world. The bulk materials Asia will need in the long term such as energy, food, environment, agricultural products, clean water, etc. will also need a vast market environment to be developed, and Russia is undoubtedly one of the most convenient sources. There are huge opportunities and space for complementary cooperation between Russia and Western Pacific countries.

Second, while China and the U.S. are in tense confrontation in current world, there is also a vast middle ground, including most middle-ground countries that still have to take care of both ends in terms of security and economy. In recent years, China's diplomatic advancement in the Asia-Pacific region has shown that if it is well planned, it may also gain opportunities to cooperate with countries that are already aligned with the U.S. Containing the situation in which some countries in the Asia-Pacific region cooperate with the U.S. and are hostile to China needs to be dealt with from the perspective of politics and regional security, meanwhile it is also completely necessary to use economic leverage to solve the problem. Even objectively speaking, the stability of Sino-US relations also has expectations and needs for such a new regional construction.

Third, not only does cooperation between Russia and the Asia-Pacific region need to be strengthened, but also, with changes in climate conditions, the opening of the Arctic shipping lanes has made it possible for the Western Pacific region to communicate with Europe through the Northern Passage of Eurasia. Although special military operation complicates the international situation, the transfer of the Russian economy to the east, the development and opening of Far East Siberia, and the gradual opening of the Northern Sea Route provide a rare strategic opportunity to promote Eurasian cooperation in the long term.

Fourth, a very important change after 2021 is the regional cooperation framework established by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP). This regional sector, led by ASEAN and actively assisted by China in its cooperation, has many years of experience in developing cooperative relations with northern partners. Over the past few years, Russia has also developed in-depth relations with ASEAN countries. No matter in economics, politics, science and technology, defense and other aspects, attention-grabbing progress has been made. In the current low ebb

of globalization, there is a need for regional construction like the "Asian Mediterranean" to re-energize the impetus for globalization based on regional cooperation. Especially in the context of the emergence of different regional cooperation mechanisms, proposing the concept of "Asian Mediterranean" will help advance the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) process.

In other words, if an effective economic cooperation zone can be built between Russia in the north and ASEAN in the south, it goes without saying that for China, which is located between the north and the south, it will be able to improve the surrounding geopolitical environment to a considerable extent, there will be a greater foundation and space for further promoting multi-faceted cooperation. Therefore, the "Asian Mediterranean" is an alternative long-term starting point for us to re-evaluate the strategic status of cooperation with Russia based on the overall situation of global transformation and management of Eurasia.

Fifth, in the future, China's internal and external economic cycle will gradually evolve from being dominated by the European and American markets in the past 40 years to finding a strategic fulcrum in the mainland, Eurasia and the western Pacific while striving to maintain its market share in Europe and the United States, so as to balance and supplement the lack of European and American markets. The original intention of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative is to seek strategic breakthroughs in the westward direction of Eurasia. Although the Belt and Road Initiative has been promoted in other aspects over the years, there is still room for significant improvement in the integration of Russia and the Belt and Road strategy. China and Russia can not only develop deeper into the Eurasian continent, but also play an important role in promoting development cooperation between Russia and countries in the Western Pacific region. Further economic development and security guarantees in China's eastern coastal areas also require "Asian Mediterranean"-style cooperation to provide opportunities. Whether it is the acquisition of the Tumen River outlet, whether it is the development of the Bohai Bay southward to the entire coastal space of China, or whether it is the stability of both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the participation of Russian factors will be an inevitable trend. Formally, this starts with the economy; but as this situation develops, there may be security opportunities and stable space for the entire region.

In terms of geo-security, due to the overlapping existence of various security complexes, the final resolution of the conflict will greatly affect the future direction of other higher-level security complexes. If a security mechanism between Russia, Ukraine and even Europe does not emerge, it will be difficult to predict the future of other regional security complexes. As a result, China can play a constructive and indispensable role in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, not only to increase the effectiveness of the new security mechanism, but more importantly to leave a diplomatic legacy in the process that will help address or better address the problems and challenges within the security complex in which it operates. From a more pessimistic perspective, if the prolongation of the special military operation is inevitable and the conflict between Russia and

Ukraine cannot be resolved, China will also weaken the comprehensive strength of the United States and its allies through independent diplomacy in the process, create conditions for external changes in the Asia-Pacific super-security complex, and use its advantages of staying away from war and economic stability to strive for greater national interests in the international arena. With the advent of the post-Cold War era and the eastward shift of the global economic center of gravity and power center, China's comprehensive rise will become a new political focus in the Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, this conflict also reminds us of that non-traditional security issues such as terrorist attacks and technological blockades have an increasing impact on international relations and cannot be ignored. As the only industrial power in the world with full industrial chain capabilities, China faces urgent challenges not only from its surrounding security environment, but also from the stable operation of the global market. For example, the sanctions system of the U.S. and its allies has had an important impact on the global semiconductor industry. Ukraine is a major supplier of semiconductor raw gases such as neon, argon, krypton and xenon, supplying nearly 70% of the world's neon gas, while Russia is one of the major suppliers of palladium, a key element in sensor and memory manufacturing. Taiwan's IT industry has the world's leading technology. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (TSMC) is Asia's largest company by market capitalization and the world's largest wafer foundry, with mass production capabilities for producing 3-nanometer chips. Today, when technology leads the development of the world, chip manufacturing capabilities play an important role. The U.S. not only requires TSMC to hand over core confidential business data, but also coerces TSMC to set up factories in the U.S. Japan also hopes that it will set up factories in Japan with the purpose of transferring production capacity from Taiwan.

Therefore, due to the restrictions of the sanction's regime, there are broad prospects for cooperation between China and Russia in the field of cutting-edge technologies. There is a high degree of complementarity between the economies of the two countries for now, also shows that the two countries should conduct joint research and development in key areas / projects. It is conducive to reducing costs and breaking the monopoly of the United States in related fields, occupy a favorable position in the future global market.

As Russia continues to carry out military operations in Ukraine, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, the European Union, Australia, Taiwan, and other countries or regions have successively introduced new export controls to suppress Russia, including restrictions on the export of semiconductor technology and equipment. Immediately afterwards, many semiconductor and technology giants around the world announced that they would cut off supply to Russia, and some high-end technology products, materials and patents facing the Chinese market were also strictly controlled. These production materials are indispensable for manufacturing high-end production equipment and military equipment. In the future, comprehensive cooperation between China and Russia in the field of high-tech R&D and application will become a new growth point for the common development of China and Russia.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States and other Western countries **will continue to increase sanctions against Russia, and the possibility of the war extending to some NATO member states cannot be ruled out, and the risk of a nuclear conflict also needs to be taken seriously.** The U.S., Russia and China have different expectations for the international order. The U.S. uses its own hegemonic interests and absolute security as its standards, Russia is trying to change its unfavorable situation in international relations, and China is moving towards building a community with a shared future for mankind. Deepening Sino-Russian cooperation is a practical requirement for stabilizing the China-U.S.-Russia strategic triangle relationship.

The core strategic interests pursued by the U.S. are to maintain its status as a superpower and its superior power in Europe and Asia. In the game of great power competition, it pays more attention to relative gains. Its definition of interests is basically in line with the realist theoretical model and can be called "interests defined by competition or conflict." In addition, **ideology** is also an important strategic interest pursued by the United States. Today, the U.S. strategic community is extremely pessimistic about the future development of the international landscape and is full of anxiety amid uncertainty. In the face of the rise of other great powers, the prospect that the United States fears most is that the hegemonic superiority of Western civilization, especially the capitalist system, can no longer control the world, triggering a fundamental and irreversible shaking of the world's worship and trust in the hegemonic system, ideology, and values represented by the U.S. Correspondingly, a brand new, more attractive and persuasive political influence and institutional influence are rapidly rising, and may bring an end to the global political prestige that the Western system has long controlled. Because of this, some elites in the U.S. and the West are anxious about the rising influence of other major powers, believing that the political warfare carried out by competing powers is damaging the foundation of the West.

China needs to adhere to bottom-line thinking, make every effort to take precautions, and improve all aspects of preparations for the U.S. to increase pressure on China through the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the next stage. In particular, it must pay attention to establishing a "barrier" for Chinese companies and related institutions to respond to U.S. and Western sanctions, ensure the safety of China's overseas assets. It should be noted that the U.S. has many new ways and strategies to deal with the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is an important exercise in proxy war and "fighting from behind" in the 21st century and deserves in-depth study. For example, how the U.S. uses its advantages in intelligence and electronic warfare to implement precise military intervention; how it uses "cognitive warfare" to isolate Russia; and how it weaves a multilateral network around economic, financial, and technological sanctions against Russia.

In addition, **multiple measures need to be taken to stabilize the security situation in Asia and ensure the overall stability of China's surrounding areas.** As the Russia-Ukraine conflict becomes protracted, various difficulties faced by Europe will further

deepen, such as the rise in energy prices and the intensification of military expenditure burden. China should deepen strategic communication with France, Germany, Poland, etc., consolidate the "stability anchor" of China-EU relations, support Europe in exploring the path of "strategic independence," and gradually build a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security architecture. As Europe faces economic difficulties, the importance of China-EU cooperation has become even more prominent. Both sides should try to improve relations on issues such as the China-EU Comprehensive Investment Agreement. In the context of fierce conflicts in Eurasia, maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region has become even more urgent. Judging from factors such as ASEAN's postponement of the US-ASEAN special summit and India's non-participation in sanctions against Russia, countries in the Asia-Pacific region will not follow the Biden administration. China needs to use the greatest common denominator of "peace and stability" to build the consensus of Asia-Pacific countries, and use "cooperative development" under the multiple difficulties of the global economy to win the support of Asia-Pacific countries. China can enhance strategic dialogue with Japan, India, Australia and other countries, and work with relevant political forces in South Korea, the Philippines and other countries in a timely manner to minimize the impact of government changes on relations with it. China should more firmly support ASEAN in playing a role in Asia-Pacific affairs, promote constructive discussions on the regional security architecture in conjunction with China's "Global Security Initiative", and effectively curb the intensification of the arms race in this region.

About the Sino-Russian cooperation and the new Eurasian space, "Asian Mediterranean" is an important concept that reflects the current height and forward-looking nature of China-Russia cooperation and will create a new situation in the development of the Asia-Pacific. The cooperation, competition, and conflicts surrounding the **Indo-Pacific region and the Asia-Pacific super complex will determine the evolution of the post-conflict international landscape.**

Finally, strengthen high-level contacts and strategic communication between China and the United States to prevent the slide into a "new cold war".

Non-traditional diplomatic behavior is an important signal that Sino-US relations are in a state of tension (see Figure 6.1). In recent years, whether in the United States or in the West, there has been constant talk that China and the United States are about to enter or have already entered a "new cold war." The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the accelerated advancement of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy have undoubtedly further aggravated the concerns of the international community. To prevent Sino-US relations from slipping into a "new cold war" and further towards competition, and confrontation, it is necessary to strengthen Sino-US high-level contacts and business and academic exchanges, especially face-to-face dialogue and exchanges between leaders **and domestic interest groups**, to eliminate misunderstandings and reduce misjudgments. View Sino-US relations from an overall and long-term perspective, rationally view and handle the differences and disagreements between China and the United States, strengthen strategic risk management and control, strengthen strategic guidance for Sino-US relations,

and avoid historical confrontation between hegemons and emerging powers, then find a new path for **peaceful coexistence and common development**.

ИСТОЧНИКИ

1. Joint Readout of Quad Leaders Call. *The White House*, March 3, 2022. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/03/joint-readout-of-quad-leaders-call/>.

2. Brunnstrom, D., Martina, M. U.S. can Focus on Two Theaters-Indo-Pacific and War in Europe, Official says. *Reuters*, March 1, 2022. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-can-focus-two-theaters-indo-pacific-war-europe-official-says-2022-02-28/>.

3. How the war in Ukraine is impacting security in the Indo-Pacific. *Breaking Defense*. June 14, 2022. Available at: <https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/how-the-war-in-ukraine-impacts-asian-security/>.

4. The United States continues to send weapons to Ukraine, Military Enterprises Make lots of "War Money". Available at: <https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20230224A0940200>.

5. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, *NATO*, June 29, 2022, p.5–10. Available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

6. Madrid Summit Declaration: Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid, *NATO*, June 29, 2022. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm

7. Vilnius Summit Communiqué: Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius, *NATO*, July 11, 2023. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm

8. Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, with Sweden, Indo-Pacific Partners, and the EU, *NATO*, July 12, 2023. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_217091.htm?selectedLocale=en.

REFERENCES

de Lisle, J., Cozen, S.A. (2022). Russia's War on Ukraine: Implications for China and Indo-Pacific Regional Security. *University of Pennsylvania*. Available at: <https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/perry-world-house/delisleukrainethoughtpiece.pdf>

Galic, M., Harding, B., Salikuddin, T., Singh, V. Amid Ukraine War, U.S. Signals the Indo-Pacific is a Vital Priority, *United States Institute of Peace*, June 9, 2022. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/amid-ukraine-war-us-signals-indo-pacific-vital-priority>.

Gipouloux, F. (2009). La Méditerranée asiatique: Villes portuaires et réseaux marchands en Chine, au Japon et en Asie du Sud-Est, XVIe -XXIe siècle. CNRS Éditions.

Hornung, J.W., Channer, H. (2022, May 26). Russia's Invasion of Ukraine May Harden U.S. Indo-Pacific Allies. *RAND Corporation*. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/05/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-may-harden-us-indo-pacific.html>

Regional Perspectives Report on the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Foresight Analysis, *The NATO Allied Command Transformation Headquarters*, May 2023. Available at: <https://www.act.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/regional-perspectives-2022-07-v2-1.pdf>

Ross, R.S. (1999). The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century. *International Security*, 23(4), pp.81–118.

Simón, L. NATO's China and Indo-Pacific conundrum, November 22, 2023, *NATO Review*. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/11/22/natos-china-and-indo-pacific-conundrum/index.html>

Wishnick, E. (2023, January 30). Ukraine's ripple effect on Russia's Indo-Pacific horizon. *Danish Institute for International Studies*. Available at: <https://www.diis.dk/en/research/ukraines-ripple-effect-on-russias-indo-pacific-horizon>.

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ АВТОРЕ / INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHOR

СУНЬ Исян, магистрант Факультета управления и политики МГИМО. Российская Федерация, 119454 Москва, Проспект Вернадского, д. 76; Факультета политологии МГУ. Российская Федерация, 119991 Москва, Ленинские горы, д. 1; Стажёр Института Китая и современной Азии Российской академии наук. Российская Федерация, 117997 Москва, Нахимовский проспект, д. 32.

SUN Yixiang, master's student of School of Governance and Politics of MGIMO, 76 Prospekt Vernadskogo, 119454 Moscow, Russian Federation; Faculty of Political Sciences of MSU. 1 Leninskie Gory, 119991 Moscow, Russian Federation; Intern at the Institute of Chinese and Contemporary Asian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 32 Nakhimovsky prospect, 117997 Moscow, Russian Federation.

Статья поступила в редакцию 06.05.2024 / Received 06.05.2024.

Поступила после рецензирования 20.05.2024 / Revised 20.05.2024.

Статья принята к публикации 10.06.2024 / Accepted 10.06.2024.